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Taboos and conflicts in decision making: sacred values, decision
difficulty, and emotions
Abstract
Previous studies suggest that choices are perceived as difficult as well as negatively emotion-laden when
they tap into moral considerations. However, we propose that the involvement of moral issues and
values can also facilitate decisions because people often insistently preclude them from trade-offs with
other values. Because such values are treated as inviolable and absolute, they are called sacred values
(e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000). Two experiments examined the influence of sacred values (measured by a
recent self-report scale) and variation of trade-off type (taboo, tragic, routine trade-offs) on perceived
decision difficulty and negative emotions. As hypothesized, decision difficulty and negative emotions
show diverging patterns as a function of sacred values and trade-off types. When the decision situation
involved two conflicting sacred values (i.e., tragic trade-off), people perceived the decision task as
emotionally stressful and difficult. However, when the decision situation was associated with only one
sacred value (i.e., taboo trade-off), people perceived the task as more negatively emotion-laden, but as
easier to solve, compared to a situation not involving sacred values (i.e., routine trade-off). These
findings suggest that reliance on sacred values may work as a heuristic.
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show diverging patterns as a function of sacred values and trade-off types. When the decision situation involved two
conflicting sacred values (i.e., tragic trade-off), people perceived the decision task as emotionally stressful and difficult.
However, when the decision situation was associated with only one sacred value (i.e., taboo trade-off), people perceived
the task as more negatively emotion-laden, but as easier to solve, compared to a situation not involving sacred values
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1 Introduction
Most normative theories of decision making view it as a
process that requires trade-offs between values. A trade-
off means compensating for a disadvantage on one value
with a benefit on some other value (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa,
1976; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). For exam-
ple, the choice between two job offers may imply a trade-
off between salary and traveling distance to work. Ac-
cording to normative theories, any types of values or at-
tributes can be traded off, in order to arrive at a choice
that maximizes subjective utility.
Decision making research, however, has rejected this
relatively simplistic view (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & John-
son, 1993). Decision tasks are sometimes perceived as
difficult, negatively emotion-laden and distressing, and
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that people often avoid making decisions (e.g., Ander-
son, 2003; Luce, 1998; Payne et al., 1993). We know
from personal experience that choices differ greatly in
their difficulty and emotional charge. For example, imag-
ine two managers of global companies who are faced with
rather different decision problems. One manager is faced
with the problem of whether to improve the poor working
conditions for which the company has been criticized by
a human rights organization, or to invest in new produc-
tion facilities in order to improve competitive capacity.
The other manager has to decide whether to improve the
poor working conditions for which the company has been
criticized by a human rights organization, or to solve the
company’s widely criticized severe environmental pollu-
tion issues.
Comparing these choices — improved working condi-
tions versus competitive capacity, on the one hand, and
improved working conditions versus environmental is-
sues, on the other — we believe that they vary in per-
ceived decision difficulty and emotional charge. Both de-
cisions may tap into moral or ethical considerations (such
as human health, environmental protection), but they may
differ in terms of how the choice options relate to moral
values. In the first decision problem, just one option may
be related to a moral value (i.e., safety at work), whereas
the second decision problem may involve two conflict-
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ing moral values (i.e., safety at work vs. environmental
protection). In general, we believe that a decision prob-
lem will be perceived as easier if people consider moral
aspects for one but not the other option. More specifi-
cally, we argue that decisions become easier when one
of the options reflects sacred values. As we will de-
scribe later in more detail, sacred values are values that
are seen as absolute and thus protected from trade-offs
with other values because they tap into moral or ethical
principles. In contrast, a decision problem should be per-
ceived as much more difficult and emotionally distress-
ing if both options reflect sacred values. Such situations
imply the necessity of trading off two moral values and,
therefore, of sacrificing one of the values. Traditional
normative views of decision making do not take into ac-
count such differences. They presume that people solve
both decision problems in an equally rational and unemo-
tional manner, and that people are able to make trade-offs
among any conflicting values.
In this paper, we focus on decision problems involv-
ing moral considerations, and we attempt to specify the
effects of sacred values on decision difficulty and emo-
tions. We define decision difficulty as the level of per-
ceived difficulty or ease of selecting among choice op-
tions. Previous studies have identified a plenty of factors
that affect decision difficulty (for a review, see Anderson,
2003). For instance, some research suggests that deci-
sion difficulty may depend on the extent to which choices
contain attributes that are difficult to trade off. This is the
case, for instance, when trade-offs pertain to attributes
that are associated with valued goals or potentially threat-
ening consequences (e.g., the trade-off between safety
and price attributes when buying a car). Luce and col-
leagues (Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997;
Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999) have shown that diffi-
cult trade-offs elicited higher levels of negative emotions
and stronger tendencies to avoid such trade-offs. Hence,
the level of negative emotions reflects the degree of trade-
off difficulty. Although it has not been measured explic-
itly, it is plausible to assume that difficult and negatively
emotion-laden trade-offs may also increase perceived de-
cision difficulty. Note that this would suggest a positive
relationship between negative emotions and decision dif-
ficulty. In other words, choices eliciting negative emo-
tions should also be perceived as difficult.
In the current study, however, we attempt to show that
certain decisions are perceived as quite easy and straight-
forward even though they elicit negative emotions. We
assume that this is particularly pronounced when deci-
sions involve moral or ethical considerations. Compared
to everyday choices (e.g., whether to buy newspaper A
or B), decisions involving moral considerations are very
likely to be more distressing and disturbing, probably
since the decision-maker realizes that something partic-
ularly important and delicate is at stake.
1.1 Sacred values and trade-off types
The concept of sacred values (or protected values) was
developed to express the idea that certain values and
moral principles are seen as absolute and non-negotiable
and thus are protected from trade-offs with other values
(Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tanner & Medin, 2004; Tan-
ner, Ryf, & Hanselmann, 2007; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson,
Lerner, & Green, 2000). A sacred value has been de-
fined as “any value that a moral community implicitly or
explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental
significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or in-
deed any other mingling with bounded or secular values”
(Tetlock et al., 2000, p. 853). Values like human life,
health, nature, love, honor, justice, or human rights are
seen as absolute and inviolable — in effect sacred. Trad-
ing them off against secular values (e.g., money) is con-
sidered taboo. For instance, previous research has shown
that people struggle to protect sacred values from trade-
offs against other values and respond with strong moral
outrage when faced with violations of such taboo trade-
offs. Moreover, it has been suggested that even the mere
contemplation of taboo trade-offs elicits strong negative
feelings of distress and disturbance (Tetlock, 2003).
The aim of the present research is to examine the ef-
fects of sacred values on decision difficulty and emotions.
More specifically, we study the effects of the following
three distinct trade-off types on decision difficulty and
emotions: Taboo trade-offs (i.e., a situation that pits a sa-
cred value against a secular value), tragic trade-offs (i.e.,
a situation that pits two sacred values against each other)
and routine trade-offs (i.e., a situation that pits two sec-
ular values against each other). Tetlock et al. (2000) in-
dicated that such trade-off types and decision difficulty
are closely related. The authors examined how partici-
pants judged another person who was faced with a taboo
or a tragic trade-off situation and who reported the task
to be easy or difficult. The authors found that decision-
makers who evaluated taboo trade-off decisions as easy
and tragic trade-off decisions as difficult were judged
positively by the participants. However, decision-makers
who evaluated taboo trade-off decisions as difficult and
tragic trade-off decisions as easy were judged negatively.
It is important to note that these findings rely on judg-
ments made from an observer perspective. Our research
will study relations between trade-off types and decision
difficulty when participants are themselves in the role of
the decision-maker.
We hypothesize that decision difficulty and negative
emotions vary as a function of sacred values and trade-off
type, and that decision difficulty and negative emotions
are associated in a non-linear fashion. Specifically, com-
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pared to routine trade-offs, we expect taboo trade-offs to
be more negatively emotion-laden, because the decision
maker may realize that sacred values are involved and
something important and delicate is at stake. Despite pro-
voking negative emotions, we suppose that the involve-
ment of just one sacred value in taboo trade-offs will help
to make decisions easier. Conversely, we expect decision
situations that imply the necessity of trading off two sa-
cred values and sacrificing one of them (tragic trade-offs)
to be associated with higher levels of negative emotions
and decision difficulty, compared to the other conditions.
1.2 Overview of experiments
We report two experiments that examined how sacred val-
ues and manipulation of trade-off types affect decision
difficulty and negative emotions. In both experiments,
participants were provided with decision scenarios that
refer to hot issues as well as everyday decisions, such as
poor working conditions, flood protection, or job selec-
tion. Each experiment includes a manipulation of trade-
off type (i.e., taboo vs. tragic vs. routine trade-off sce-
narios), and each scenario provides a choice between two
options.
As an important manipulation check, we examine the
extent to which participants associate sacred values with
the choice options and whether trade-off types really cor-
respond with sacred value endorsements. To assess peo-
ple’s endorsement of sacred values, we utilize the re-
cently developed Sacred Values Measure (SVM; Tanner
et al., 2007). In Experiment 1, a previous version of
the instrument is used, whereas Experiment 2 contains
the improved final version (see Appendix B). This scale
was designed to tap into important features of sacred val-
ues (e.g., unwillingness to sacrifice a value, incommen-
surability, trade-off resistance). Participants are provided
with several items and asked to indicate the extent of their
agreement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The SVM was shown to have good internal consistency
in several studies, yielding α’s higher than .79 (Tanner
et al., 2007). In terms of construct validity, the scale
was compared with measures of moral outrage (e.g., Tet-
lock et al., 2000) and attitude strength (e.g., Pomerantz,
Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). Although the moral out-
rage items represent a more “indirect” approach to sacred
values (i.e., people’s reactions to observed violations of
sacred values are assessed), the SVM is designed to mea-
sure essential features of sacred values in a more “direct”
manner. The studies revealed that moral outrage mea-
sures and our sacred values measure represent conceptu-
ally distinct factors, even though they are highly corre-
lated (rs > .76). Furthermore, we found evidence in sev-
eral studies that sacred values differ conceptually from
strong attitudes. As our focus in the current research
lies on the decision-maker’s perspective rather than the
observer’s perspective, sacred value measurement by the
SVM seems to be more appropriate than the moral out-
rage approach.
In both experiments, the primary dependent variables
were perceived decision difficulty and negative emotions.
Decision difficulty was measured by a single item (Ex-
periment 1) or by a short set of items regarding various
aspects of decision difficulty (Experiment 2). Negative
emotions were also assessed using various approaches. In
Experiment 1, we present a set of five items focusing on
emotional stress. In Experiment 2, we utilize the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark,
& Tellegen, 1988).
2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examines how sacred values and trade-off
type are related to decision difficulty and negative emo-
tions. As outlined in the introduction, we hypothesize
that decision difficulty and negative emotions are associ-
ated in a non-linear fashion, depending on trade-off type.
We call the three types: taboo, meaning that one of the
values is sacred; tragic, meaning that both are sacred; and
routine, meaning that neither value is sacred.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and design
A sample of 84 students from the University of Zurich
(65 women, 19 men) completed a paper-and- pencil ques-
tionnaire that contained three decision scenarios. Partic-
ipants’ ages ranged from 18 to 63 years (M = 25.39).
They were recruited by advertisements in several study
courses. In return for their participation, respondents
were given the opportunity to take part in a prize draw.
Participants were provided with one of two differ-
ent scenario combinations, each consisting of a taboo, a
tragic, and a routine trade-off scenario. Therefore, the de-
sign was a 3 (trade-off type: taboo vs. tragic vs. routine)
X 2 (scenario combination: A vs. B) factorial design with
trade-off type as within-subject factor and scenario com-
bination as between-subject factor. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two between-subject condi-
tions. Dependent variables were sacred value endorse-
ments, negative emotions, decision, and decision diffi-
culty.
2.1.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects were tested in small groups containing a maxi-
mum of five persons. Materials were written in German.
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Table 1: Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements, decision, decision difficulty, and negative
emotions, for each scenario (n = 83).
Sacred valuea
Scenario Option 1 Option 2 Decisionb Difficultyc Neg. emot.d
Taboo trade-offs
Flood protection 4.77 (1.24) 3.14 (1.07) 1.26 (0.59) 1.83 (0.94) 2.58 (0.81)
Safety at work 4.93 (1.40) 3.09 (0.81) 1.59 (0.87) 2.85 (1.57) 3.98 (1.30)
Tragic trade-offs
Flood protection 3.73 (0.94) 4.11 (1.01) 3.71 (1.71) 4.98 (1.67) 4.37 (1.39)
Safety at work 4.53 (1.29) 4.00 (1.19) 2.79 (1.35) 5.52 (1.47) 5.13 (1.31)
Routine trade-off
Job offer 3.03 (0.77) 3.92 (1.23) 5.27 (1.87) 2.89 (1.65) 2.90 (1.20)
Note. All ratings were made on 7-point scales.
a The higher the scores, the higher the sacred value endorsements.
b The lower the score, the stronger the preference for option 1.
c The higher the score, the higher the level of perceived decision difficulty.
d The higher the score, the higher the level of negative emotions.
Each participant was presented with three scenarios, rep-
resenting a taboo, a tragic or a routine trade-off, that were
selected from a total set of five scenarios.
This set of scenarios involved three different topics
(i.e., “flood protection”, “safety at work”, and “job of-
fer”), based upon which two taboo trade-off scenarios,
two tragic trade-off scenarios, and one routine trade-off
scenario were constructed. In order to ensure that each
participant received a taboo and a tragic trade-off sce-
nario dealing with different topics, two scenario combina-
tions were utilized as between-subject factor. More pre-
cisely, participants assigned to scenario combination A
received the topic “flood protection” as the taboo, “safety
at work” as the tragic, and “job offer” as the routine trade-
off scenario, whereas those assigned to scenario combi-
nation B received the topic “safety at work” as the taboo,
“flood protection” as the tragic, and “job offer” as the
routine trade-off scenario. Within each scenario combi-
nation, scenarios were presented in an order randomized
for each subject.
Each scenario provided a choice between two options.
For instance, the taboo trade-off scenario with the topic
“flood protection” was as follows (for a description of the
other scenarios and tasks, see Appendix A).
Imagine that you are the president of the lo-
cal authority of a village that has been severely
affected by a flood. The local authority is
discussing whether to invest a considerable
amount of the annual budget in improved flood
protection measures. In this case, however, the
village would have to forego a planned facelift
for the village square. As president, you have to
decide between the improvements in flood pro-
tection (option 1) and the facelift for the village
square (option 2).
After presenting the scenario, participants were asked
to respond to a previous version of the SVM consisting
of 4 items (α = .66) (see Appendix B). This was done
for each option separately. A set of 5 questions was then
provided to assess negative emotions associated with the
decision situation (α = .89; see Appendix B). These items
were adapted following Luce et al. (1999) and Gaab,
Rohleder, Nater, and Ehlert (2005). Participants were
asked to indicate their agreement on a 7-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (e.g.,
“I am swamped with this decision”). After that, they had
to make a choice between these two alternatives on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (clearly in favor of option 1)
to 7 (clearly in favor of option 2). Finally, participants
were given one item to indicate the perceived decision
difficulty on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to
7 (very difficult).
2.2 Results and discussion
One participant was excluded from analyses because of
missing data. Table 1 shows scale means and standard
deviations for sacred value endorsements, decision, per-
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Table 2: Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred
value endorsements as a function of trade-off type and
option (n = 83).
Sacred value
Taboo Tragic Routine
Option 1 a4.85x (1.31) b4.13x (1.19) c3.03x (0.77)
Option 2 a3.11y (0.94) b4.06x (1.10) b3.92y (1.23)
Note. Within a row, cell means with different subscripts
(a, b, c) differ significantly at p < .001 in Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons. Within a column, cell
means with different subscripts (x, y) differ significantly
at p < .001 in Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons.
ceived decision difficulty, and negative emotions, listed
for each scenario. Decision responses were not further
analyzed as they are not of primary interest with regard
to our hypotheses.
As a manipulation check, we first examined whether
trade-off types corresponded with endorsements of sa-
cred values (SVM). These endorsements were analyzed
with a mixed model ANOVA (trade-off type X option
X scenario combination), with trade-off type and op-
tion as within-subject factors and scenario combination
as between-subject factor. The trade-off type X option
interaction was significant, F(2, 162) = 80.95, p < .001.
This interaction effect was analyzed by computing sim-
ple main effects for both trade-off type and option. Table
2 shows the main results revealed by Bonferroni-adjusted
pairwise comparisons. Significant simple main effects of
trade-off type were found for options 1 and 2, Fs(2, 80) >
29.71, ps < .001. Furthermore, options differed from each
other in the taboo trade-off condition, F(1, 81) = 104.05,
p < .001, to a lesser extent in the routine trade-off condi-
tion, F(1, 81) = 50.30, p < .001, but not in the tragic trade-
off condition, F(1, 81) = 0.30, p = .586. Importantly, the
results confirm that the (objective) manipulation of trade-
off types corresponded with the (subjective) sacred value
endorsements. In other words, people were likely to asso-
ciate only one option with sacred values in taboo trade-off
scenarios and both options in tragic trade-off scenarios.
Contrary to our expectations, the endorsement for option
2 was somewhat higher for the routine trade-off scenario,
indicating that the underlying issue also tapped into a sa-
cred value.
Next, we tested our hypothesis that decision difficulty
and negative emotions vary as a function of trade-off
type. A MANOVA was conducted to examine the ef-
fects of trade-off types on decision difficulty and nega-
tive emotions. Significant effects were further analyzed
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Figure 1: Scale means (+ SE) for decision difficulty and
negative emotions as a function of trade-off type (n = 83).
by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. Most im-
portantly, the findings provide support for the hypothesis
that decision difficulty and negative emotions vary as a
function of trade-off type, Wilks’ Λ = .23, F(4, 78) =
66.35, p < .001. For decision difficulty, a significant main
effect of trade-off type emerged, F(2, 162) = 94.42, p <
.001. Compared to the routine trade-off condition (M =
2.89), the decision was perceived as easier in the taboo
trade-off condition (M = 2.34), and as considerably more
difficult in the tragic trade-off condition (M = 5.25). Pair-
wise comparisons showed that all mean differences with
regard to decision difficulty were significant (ps < .05).
Additionally, in line with our expectations, we found a
significant main effect for negative emotions, F(2, 162) =
91.31, p < .001. Compared to the routine trade-off con-
dition (M = 2.90), participants felt slightly more negative
in the taboo trade-off condition (M = 3.28) and consid-
erably more negative in the tragic trade-off condition (M
= 4.75). Pairwise comparisons yielded significant mean
differences (ps < .05).
As can be seen in Figure 1, taboo trade-offs were per-
ceived as easier compared to routine trade-offs, while
tragic trade-offs were perceived as most difficult. Nega-
tive emotions also showed the expected pattern, though
the scores reflected in general only moderate levels of
emotions. Compared to routine trade-off scenarios, neg-
ative emotions were somewhat stronger in taboo trade-
off scenarios and considerably stronger in tragic trade-
off scenarios. Altogether, the findings lend initial support
to the proposition that perceived decision difficulty and
negative emotions vary as a function of trade-off types
(and indirectly also as a function of sacred value endorse-
ments).
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3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate previous findings by ad-
dressing four possibly critical points. First, we wished
to improve the measure for decision difficulty by using
multiple items instead of a single item. Second, with
regard to negative emotions, we wished to replicate our
findings using the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988), a
well-established and validated instrument. Third, in or-
der to strengthen the manipulation of trade-off type, we
slightly modified the content of some scenarios. Fourth,
we wanted to ensure that the measurement of sacred value
of option 1 and 2 is not influenced by any direct trade-
offs among these options. We therefore improved our de-
sign to uncouple sacred value assessments from the sub-
sequent trade-off and choice processes.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and design
A sample of 130 students from the University of Zurich
(90 women, 40 men) completed an online questionnaire
that contained two hypothetical decision scenarios. Sub-
jects’ ages ranged from 18 to 46 years (M = 24.37). They
were recruited by advertisements via e-mail. In return
for their participation, respondents obtained course credit
points and were given the opportunity to take part in a
prize draw.
Two different scenario combinations, each consisting
of a taboo, a tragic, and a routine trade-off scenario, were
utilized. In each combination, the scenarios varied in
topic. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two scenario combinations. From this combination,
participants were provided with only two of the three
trade-off types, which were also randomly selected. For
our analyses, we extracted a trade-off type variable (i.e.,
taboo vs. tragic vs. routine trade-off) based on these
combinations. Thus, trade-off type and scenario combi-
nation were used as independent variables. The depen-
dent variables were sacred value endorsements, negative
emotions, decision difficulty, and decision.
3.1.2 Materials and procedure
Materials were written in German. Again, a total set of
five scenarios was utilized. This set involved the same
three topics as in Experiment 1 (i.e., “flood protection”,
“safety at work”, and “job offer”), based upon which two
taboo scenarios, two tragic scenarios, and one routine
trade-off scenario were constructed. In order to ensure
that each participant received two scenarios represent-
ing two different trade-off types as well as two different
topics, two scenario combinations were used. More pre-
cisely, scenario combination A included the topic “flood
protection” as the taboo, “safety at work” as the tragic,
and “job offer” as the routine trade-off scenario, whereas
scenario combination B included the topic “safety at
work” as the taboo, “flood protection” as the tragic, and
“job offer” as the routine trade-off scenario. As men-
tioned above, participants were randomly assigned to one
of these two scenario combinations, and were presented
with only two of three trade-off types, which were ran-
domly selected from the respective scenario combination.
The description of the choice options referring to some
scenarios was slightly modified. In particular, we tried
to improve the routine trade-off scenario, making it less
likely to be associated with sacred values (for a descrip-
tion of scenarios, see Appendix A). Furthermore, differ-
ent from the previous study, the choice options were pre-
sented sequentially (rather than simultaneously), and sa-
cred value endorsements for each option were assessed
before any trade-off task was salient to the participant.
Note that the order of the options was randomly selected
throughout the experiment, and that the instructions as
well as the descriptions of the scenarios were adjusted ac-
cordingly. An example of the procedure is the following
(tragic trade-off dealing with conflicting issues “safety at
work” vs. “environmental protection”; see Appendix A
for a description of the other scenarios).
Imagine that you are the CEO of a global com-
pany that has been criticized for poor working
conditions in a Chinese factory. You are at-
tending a meeting of the management. There
is a discussion of whether measures to improve
safety at work should be taken. You now have
to consider your position on improving safety
at work, because there will be a vote at the end
of the meeting.
Participants were then given the final version of the
SVM (5 items, α = .81; see Appendix B for items) to as-
sess the extent to which “safety at work” was associated
with sacred values. After completing this task, partici-
pants were provided with the continuation of the scenario
and the second option.
Before the final vote, further topics are dis-
cussed. Your company has come under fire
because large amounts of waste and pollutants
are being discharged by the factories. There
is a discussion about whether measures for en-
vironmental protection should be taken. You
should now consider your position on environ-
mental protection, because there will be a vote
at the end of the meeting.
Again, respondents were given the SVM, this time to
examine the extent to which “environmental protection”
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Table 3: Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred value endorsements, decision, decision difficulty, and negative
emotions, for each scenario (n = 223).
Sacred valuea
Scenario Option 1 Option 2 Decisionb Difficultyc Neg. emot.d
Taboo trade-offs
Flood protection 4.07 (1.13) 2.82 (1.01) 1.67 (0.71) 3.51 (1.77) 2.07 (0.73)
Safety at work 5.18 (1.13) 2.33 (1.13) 2.08 (1.77) 2.71 (1.23) 2.06 (0.74)
Tragic trade-offs
Flood protection 3.78 (1.23) 4.32 (1.16) 3.96 (1.95) 4.26 (1.70) 2.36 (0.85)
Safety at work 5.49 (1.31) 5.41 (1.17) 3.93 (2.07) 5.01 (1.51) 3.11 (0.75)
Routine trade-off
Job offer 2.77 (0.81) 2.46 (0.80) 2.74 (1.64) 3.77 (1.46) 1.86 (0.70)
Note. Ratings for sacred values, decision, and decision difficulty were made on 7-point scales,
whereas ratings for negative emotions were made on 5-point scales.
a The higher the scores, the higher the sacred value endorsements; for each scenario, scores refer to
the order of options as it is shown in the method section and the appendix.
b The lower the score, the stronger the preference for option 1.
c The higher the score, the higher the level of perceived decision difficulty.
d The higher the score, the higher the level of negative emotions.
was associated with sacred values. Finally, the decision
task was introduced and participants were asked to make
a choice between options 1 and 2.
This is the end of the meeting, and both sug-
gestions, investing in safety at work and in en-
vironmental protection, have been approved.
Because the implementation of both projects
would exceed the available budget, you as CEO
have to make the final choice between investing
in safety at work (option 1) and investing in en-
vironmental protection (option 2).
After being presented with the final decision situation,
participants were given the PANAS (20 items) to measure
positive and negative emotions associated with the deci-
sion situation (Watson et al., 1988; German translation
by Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; see Ap-
pendix B). Participants were asked to indicate their feel-
ings on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (very slightly or not
at all) to 5 (extremely) (e.g., “afraid”, “jittery”). The pos-
itive emotion items were also included, although we only
used the negative emotion items in this study (α = .90 for
negative emotions subscale).
Perceived decision difficulty was assessed using 5
items (α = .89), designed to measure various aspects of
decision difficulty (such as ambivalence, certainty of de-
cision, readiness to decide, or need for additional time).
People are asked to indicate their extent of agreement on
7-point scales ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very dif-
ficult) or from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
(e.g., “I feel very ambivalent about this decision”) (see
Appendix B).
Finally, they indicated their decision on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (clearly in favor of option 1) to 7 (clearly
in favor of option 2).
3.2 Results and discussion
Data collection yielded a total of 260 scenarios, com-
pleted by 130 subjects. Due to failures in data transfer,
37 scenarios had to be excluded. Therefore, data analy-
ses are based upon the remaining 223 scenarios. Table
3 shows scale means and standard deviations for sacred
value endorsements (SVM), decision, perceived decision
difficulty, and negative emotions, listed for each scenario.
Decision responses were not further examined as they are
not of primary interest with regard to our hypotheses.
As a manipulation check, we first examined whether
trade-off types corresponded with endorsements of sacred
values. These endorsements were analyzed with a mixed
model ANOVA (trade-off type X option X scenario com-
bination), with trade-off type and scenario combination
as between subject factors and option as within-subject
factor. As a result, a significant trade-off type X option
interaction emerged, F(2, 217) = 60.09, p < .001. This in-
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Table 4: Scale means (standard deviations) for sacred
value endorsements as a function of trade-off type and
option (n = 223).
Sacred value
Taboo Tragic Routine
Option 1 a4.63x (1.13) a4.63x (1.27) b2.77x (0.81)
Option 2 a2.57y (1.07) b4.86x (1.16) a2.46y (0.80)
Note. Scores refer to the order of options as it is shown in
the method section and the appendix. Within a row, cell
means with different subscripts (a, b) differ significantly
at p < .001 in Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons.
Within a column, cell means with different subscripts (x,
y) differ significantly at p < .05 in Bonferroni-adjusted
pairwise comparisons.
teraction was further analyzed by computing simple main
effects for both trade-off type and option. Table 4 shows
the main results revealed by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise
comparisons. Simple main effect analyses yielded signif-
icant effects of trade-off type for options 1 and 2, Fs(2,
217) > 75.76, p < .001. Moreover, options differed from
each other in the taboo trade-off condition, F(1, 217) =
163.09, p < .001, and, to a lesser extent, in the tragic
trade-off condition, F(1, 217) = 2.57, p = .11, as well
as in the routine trade-off condition, F(1, 217) = 5.31,
p < .05. Thus, the results confirm that the sacred value
endorsements varied as expected and the manipulation of
trade-off type was therefore successful for the taboo and
tragic trade-off condition. For the routine trade-off condi-
tion, however, the difference between options 1 and 2 was
not expected, but the considerably low endorsements in-
dicate that participants perceived the options as not being
associated with sacred values.
Next, we tested our hypothesis that decision difficulty
and negative emotions vary as a function of trade-off
type. A MANOVA provided further support that deci-
sion difficulty and negative emotions vary as a function
of trade-off type, Wilks’ Λ = .74, F(4, 432) = 17.99, p
< .001. For decision difficulty, a significant main effect
of trade-off type emerged, F(2, 217) = 15.91, p < .001.
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that
the means showed the expected pattern: Compared to the
routine trade-off condition (M = 3.77), the decision was
perceived as more difficult in the tragic trade-off condi-
tion (M = 4.64), and as easier in the taboo trade-off con-
dition (M = 3.11). Pairwise comparisons showed that all
mean differences were significant (ps < .05). Further-
more, we found again a significant main effect for neg-
ative emotions, F(2, 217) = 28.37, p < .001. Closer ex-
amination of the emotions revealed the expected tenden-
cies, even though the pattern was somewhat less prevalent
than in Experiment 1. Compared to the routine trade-off
condition (M = 1.86), participants tended to feel more
negative in the taboo trade-off condition (M = 2.07); al-
though this difference failed to reach significance (p =
.326). In the tragic trade-off condition, the reported level
of negative emotions (M = 2.74), however, was signifi-
cantly higher than in the other trade-off conditions (ps <
.001).
Overall, the patterns tend to replicate those of Experi-
ment 1, in that decision difficulty and negative emotions
are associated in a non-linear fashion as a function of dis-
tinct trade-off types and sacred value endorsements.
4 General discussion
The present research helps to clarify how decision diffi-
culty and emotions are associated with trade-off types and
sacred values. Our main findings were as follows: First,
trade-offs involving sacred values tended to be more neg-
atively emotion-laden than trade-offs not involving sa-
cred values. This applied particularly to situations that
pit one sacred value against another sacred value (i.e.,
tragic trade-off), and to a lesser extent to situations that
pit one sacred value against a secular value (i.e., taboo
trade-off). Second, the decision difficulty varied as a
function of trade-off types. Compared to routine trade-off
situations (i.e., two opposing secular values), decisions
were perceived as easier when they involve taboo trade-
offs, but, conversely, as more difficult when they involve
tragic trade-offs. Third, negative emotions and perceived
decision difficulty showed a non-linear relationship. In
the taboo trade-off condition, people perceived the tasks
as more negatively emotion-laden, but as easier to solve,
compared to the routine trade-off condition. However, in
the tragic trade-off condition, people perceived the deci-
sion tasks as most stressful and difficult.
The finding that trade-offs involving sacred values are
relatively more negatively emotion-laden than routine
trade-offs is in line with Tetlock’s (2003) assumption that
the mere contemplation of trade-offs that touch on sa-
cred values elicits negative feelings of distress and distur-
bance. We believe that the emotions function as a signal
to the decision-maker that something delicate and impor-
tant is at stake that has to be protected. In this sense, the
emotions may play an “advisory” or “informational” role
in decision making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al.,
2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Zajonc, 1998; see also
Pfister & Böhm, 2008, and Zeelenberg et al., 2008).
Trade-off types and decision difficulty were related in
that taboo trade-off situations were perceived as easy,
whereas tragic trade-off situations were perceived as dif-
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ficult. At least with regard to the supposed associa-
tion between taboo trade-off situations and decision dif-
ficulty, our findings are consistent with recent findings
from Lichtenstein, Gregory, and Irwin (2007). In order
to examine people’s reactions to decision tasks address-
ing “taboo values” (i.e., sacred values), Lichtenstein et
al. utilized a variety of preference measures (e.g., will-
ingness to accept). Consistent with our research, they
showed that decisions involving taboo values provoke
negative emotions, while being perceived as easy to judge
and as not demanding extensive thought. However, the
authors did not examine trade-offs involving several con-
flicting values. As to tragic trade-offs, our findings sug-
gest that the necessity of sacrificing one of these values
intensifies both negative emotions and decision difficulty.
Our findings on how taboo and tragic trade-offs are
linked to perceived decision difficulty can, in a sense,
be seen as complementary to findings by Tetlock et al.
(2000). As mentioned above, these authors examined
the relationship between trade-off type and decision diffi-
culty by letting participants judge other people’s decision
making. Their results provide an idea of which associ-
ations between trade-off type and decision difficulty are
socially approved or disapproved. In contrast, we exam-
ined the relationship between trade-off type and decision
difficulty by examining participants’ own decision mak-
ing. We found that taboo trade-off situations were per-
ceived as easy and tragic trade-off situations were per-
ceived as difficult. In line with this, Tetlock et al. showed
that people will gain social approval when they perceive
the relationship between trade-off type and decision dif-
ficulty in this mentioned way. However, people will gain
social disapproval when they evaluate taboo trade-off de-
cisions as difficult and tragic trade-off decisions as easy.
As mentioned, decisions involving taboo trade-offs ap-
pear to be perceived as easy. This suggests that one func-
tion of sacred values could be to facilitate decisions (as
long as they do not conflict with other sacred values). As
stated, sacred values are protected from trade-offs with
other values (i.e., secular values), therefore triggering
noncompensatory decision strategies. Perhaps a form of
“one-reason decision making” (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the
ABC Research Group, 1999) might apply here, with sa-
cred values providing a sufficient reason for preferring a
particular option. Sacred values may work as a kind of
moral heuristic or choice rule (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Luce,
1998; Sunstein, 2005). Of course, future research is
needed to examine more thoroughly how sacred values
affect decision processes.
The idea of a heuristic function of sacred values has
some affinity with theories of moral judgment that refer
to dual process models (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999;
Chaiken & Trope, 1999). It has been proposed that moral
judgment is primarily based on intuitive (i.e., fast and
effortless) rather than deliberative (i.e., slow and effort-
ful) processes (Haidt, 2001). It is possible that taboo
trade-offs engage intuitive or affective processes, whereas
tragic trade-offs engage deliberate processes. In the for-
mer case, the presence of just one sacred value option al-
lows a quick choice in the sense of the mentioned moral
heuristic. This notion is in accordance with Lichten-
stein et al.’s findings (2007) that responses to taboo sce-
narios are driven primarily by affect. However, in the
case of a tragic trade-off (i.e., two conflicting sacred val-
ues), our findings of high negative emotions as well as
high decision difficulty suggest stronger deliberate rea-
soning, in addition to emotional processes. This inter-
pretation is in accordance with findings based on ma-
nipulated differences of the attractiveness of choice op-
tions (e.g., Dhar, 1997; Luce, 1998; Luce et al., 1997):
Conflict between similarly attractive options was found
to increase negative emotions, vigilant and information-
acquisitive processing, and preference for avoidance op-
tions, if available. Moreover, the suggestion of simulta-
neous affective as well as reasoning processes of moral
judgments was supported by recent findings from cog-
nitive neuroscience (Greene & Haidt, 2002). In difficult
moral dilemmas comparable to tragic trade-off situations,
increased activities in brain regions associated with con-
flict, emotions (e.g., contempt and disgust) as well as with
abstract reasoning and utilitarian judgments have been
found (Greene et al., 2004).
Clearly, future research is needed to uncover in more
detail the nature of processes underlying the facilitating
effects of sacred values. With respect to the measurement
of decision difficulty, additional or alternative measure-
ment methods (e.g., reaction times or neural indicators)
may be considered in future designs. Another method-
ological issue will also be further improving the assess-
ment of emotions and clarifying the role of emotions
when decisions tap into sacred values. It is important
to note that our experiments evoked, on the whole, rela-
tively mild emotions. Even though the emotional ratings
in the situations containing taboo trade-offs tended to be
perceived as more negative than in the routine trade-off
situations, the emotional intensities and differences were
smaller than expected. Recently, research also examin-
ing the emotional reactions to taboo trade-offs has found
considerably stronger emotions triggered by taboo issues
(Ginges et al., 2007; Lichtenstein et al., 2007). It may
be that our scenarios were not vivid enough to provoke
stronger emotions. Furthermore, recall that we used two
different measures for negative emotions. These mea-
sures might not be entirely comparable (i.e., focus on
emotional stress vs. negative affect in general); this could
possibly explain why we found a significant difference
in negative emotions between taboo and routine trade-off
scenarios in the first but not in the second experiment.
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In conclusion, sacred values as a possible source of de-
cision difficulty, conflict, and emotions have mostly been
neglected in prior research. Our findings suggest that sa-
cred values may play a distinctive role in decision mak-
ing because people preclude sacred values from trade-offs
with other values. By introducing the role of sacred val-
ues and trade-off reluctance, we believe that our approach
contributes significantly to the growing body of research
on moral intuition and moral heuristics.
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Appendix A
Decision scenarios used in Experiment 1
Note. The following scenarios are described in an ab-
breviated version; the original was in German. The taboo
trade-off “flood protection” scenario is omitted here since
it is provided in the text.
Taboo trade-off, “safety at work”. Imagine that you
are the CEO of a global company that has been criti-
cized for poor working conditions in a Chinese factory.
The management is discussing whether substantial in-
vestments to improve safety at work should be made. In
this case, however, you would have to give up the goal
of a profit increase. As CEO, you have to decide between
investing in safety at work (option 1) and increasing profit
(option 2).
Tragic trade-off, “flood protection”. Imagine that you
are the president of the local authority of a village that
has been severely affected by a flood. The local author-
ity is discussing whether to invest a considerable amount
of the annual budget in improved flood protection mea-
sures. In this case, however, the village would have to
forego a planned project for vocational training and in-
tegration for unemployed adolescents. As president, you
have to decide between the improvements in flood pro-
tection (option 1) and the project for vocational training
and integration (option 2).
Tragic trade-off, “safety at work”. Imagine that you
are the CEO of a global company that has been criti-
cized for poor working conditions in a Chinese factory.
The management is discussing whether substantial in-
vestments to improve safety at work should be made. In
this case, however, you would have to accept the layoff of
a third of the workforce due to financial reasons, thereby
jeopardizing the future of many families. As CEO, you
have to decide between investing in safety at work (option
1) and preserving jobs (option 2).
Routine trade-off, “job offer”. Imagine that you, as
a parent, are solely responsible for your family’s liveli-
hood. You have made several applications to find a new
job. You have just received two offers, and it is now up to
you to select one of them. Company A offers you an an-
nual salary of CHF 80,000 [USD 66,000] and 20 vacation
days per year, whereas company B offers you an annual
salary of CHF 60,000 [USD 50,000] and 30 vacation days
per year. You now have to decide between the job with a
greater annual salary (option 1) and the job with a greater
number of vacation days per year (option 2).
Decision scenarios used in Experiment 2
Note. The following scenarios are described in an abbre-
viated version; the original was in German. The tragic
trade-off “safety at work” scenario is omitted here since
it is provided in the text. Numbers in parentheses at the
beginning of each paragraph were not given to the par-
ticipants; they represent the position in the sequential ex-
perimental procedure, that is, (1) presentation of option
1, (2) presentation of option 2, and (3) presentation of the
final decision situation.
Taboo trade-off, “flood protection”. (1) Imagine that
you are the president of the local authority of a village
that has been severely affected by a flood. Currently, you
are attending a meeting of the authority. There is a discus-
sion about whether measures to improve flood protection
should be taken. You now have to consider your posi-
tion on improving flood protection, because there will be
a vote at the end of the meeting.
(2) Before the final vote, further topics are discussed.
Your village square has been in a pitiful condition due
to unauthorized parking and damaged paving. There is a
discussion about whether measures for a facelift for the
village square should be taken. You should now consider
your position on the facelift for the village square, be-
cause there will be a vote at the end of the meeting.
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both sugges-
tions, improvements in flood protection as well as the
facelift for the village, have been approved. Because
the implementation of both projects exceeds the available
budget, you as president have to make the final choice
between improvements in flood protection (option 1) and
facelift for the village square (option 2).
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Taboo trade-off, “safety at work”. (1) Imagine that
you are the CEO of a global company that has been crit-
icized for poor working conditions in a Chinese factory.
You are attending a meeting of the management. There
is a discussion of whether measures to improve safety at
work should be taken. You now have to consider your
position on improving safety at work, because there will
be a vote at the end of the meeting.
(2) Before the final vote, other topics are discussed.
Your company has come under pricing pressure, be-
cause many competitors have a higher production vol-
ume. Hence, in order to cut prices, it has been suggested
that production should be increased through additional
facilities. You should now consider your position on in-
creasing the production through additional facilities, be-
cause there will be a vote at the end of the meeting.
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both sugges-
tions, improving safety at work as well as increasing the
production, have been approved. Because the implemen-
tation of both projects would exceed the available bud-
get, you as CEO have to make the final choice between
investing in safety at work (option 1) and increasing the
production (option 2).
Tragic trade-off, “flood protection”. (1) Imagine that
you are a member of the local authority of a village that
has been severely affected by a flood. Currently, you are
attending a meeting of the authority. There is a discus-
sion about whether measures for improved flood protec-
tion should be taken. You now have to consider your po-
sition on improving flood protection, because there will
be a vote at the end of the meeting.
(2) Before the final vote, further topics are discussed.
Your village has been faced with growing juvenile vio-
lence and delinquency. Hence, there is a discussion about
whether a project for vocational training and integration
for unemployed adolescents should be launched. You
should now consider your position on the project for vo-
cational training and integration, because there will be a
vote at the end of the meeting.
(3) This is the end of the meeting, and both sugges-
tions, improvements in flood protection as well as the
project for vocational training and integration for unem-
ployed adolescents, have been approved. Because the im-
plementation of both projects exceeds the available bud-
get, you as president have to make the final choice be-
tween improvements in flood protection (option 1) and
the project for vocational training and integration (option
2).
Routine trade-off, “job offer”. (1) Imagine that you,
as a parent, are solely responsible for your family’s liveli-
hood. One day, you hear about a vacant position in an-
other division, which provides a better salary than your
current one. You now have to consider your opinion about
the level of your income.
(2) A couple of days later, you hear about a vacant po-
sition at another branch office, which requires a shorter
traveling distance to work than is currently the case. You
should now consider your opinion about the traveling dis-
tance to work.
(3) Your boss informs you that the division you are
working for is going to be closed, but that he intends to
employ you further. He offers you the same two jobs that
you have already heard about. The first offer provides a
better salary, but requires a longer traveling distance to
work since it has been relocated to another branch. The
second offer requires a shorter traveling distance to work,
but provides a lower salary. You now have to decide be-
tween a better salary (option 1) and a shorter traveling
distance to work (option 2).
Appendix B
Sacred value measure
Note. Each item is followed by a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree].
Experiment 1 (previous version of SVM). Please rate
your level of agreement with the following statements
about [insert option 1 or 2; e.g., improving safety at
work].
1. My stance on this issue might change over time.
2. I would not change my opinion, no matter what the
costs.
3. I would have problems making any concessions on
this topic.
4. There are principles involved in this topic that we
should defend under any circumstances.
Experiment 2 (final version of SVM). Please rate your
level of agreement with the following statements about
[insert option 1 or 2; e.g., improving safety at work]: [In-
sert option 1 or 2] is about something...
1. . . . that we should not sacrifice, no matter what the
benefits (money or something else).
2. ...which one cannot quantify with money.
3. . . . for which I think it is right to make the cost-
benefit analyses.
4. . . . that involves issues or values which are invio-
lable.
5. . . . for which I can be flexible if the situation de-
mands it.
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Negative emotions measures
Experiment 1 (scale of 5 items). Note. Each item is
followed by a 7-point scale ranging from 1 [strongly dis-
agree] to 7 [strongly agree].
Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements, with respect to the current decision situation.
1. I am afraid to make the wrong choice.
2. This choice is threatening to me.
3. I am afraid to make a choice.
4. I am swamped with this decision.
5. This decision leaves me cold.
Experiment 2 (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). Note.
Instruction: “In the following you are presented with a
number of words that describe different feelings and emo-
tions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate level
of intensity on the scale next to that word. You can se-
lect from five levels.” Each item is followed by a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 [very slightly or not at all] to 5
[extremely]). aNegative emotion items, bpositive emotion
items.
In the current decision situation, I am feel-
ing: alertb, afraida, proudb, upseta, hostilea, strongb,
irritablea, ashameda, nervousa, activeb, distresseda,
scareda, attentiveb, guiltya, determinedb, interestedb,
enthusiasticb, excitedb, jitterya, inspiredb.
Decision difficulty measures
Experiment 1 (single item). How easy or difficult was
it for you to decide? For me, this decision was... (7-point
scale ranging from 1 [very easy] to 7 [very difficult])
Experiment 2 (scale of 5 items). Note. Each item is
followed by a 7-point scale ranging from 1 [strongly dis-
agree] to 7 [strongly agree], except for item 1.
Please rate your level of agreement with the following
statements, with respect to the current decision situation.
1. For me, this decision is... (7-point scale ranging
from 1 [very easy] to 7 [very difficult])
2. I would need more time to decide.
3. I would not ponder for a long time on this decision.
4. I feel very ambivalent about this decision.
5. For this decision, I feel certain which option to
choose.
